MAKING A MOUNTAIN OUT OF A MOLEHILL?
MARBURY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CANON
Amanda Rinderle and Keith E. Whittington
How important was Marbury v. Madison in American constitutional history? This
article examines judicial, legislative and executive citations and legal commentary
to show that Marbury did not enter the constitutional canon as the fountainhead of
judicial review until the turn of the twentieth century. In doing so, it reveals the
process by which historical memories are constructed and adds to our
understanding about the diverse sources of judicial review in the early republic
and the rhetoric of judicial authority.

Everybody “knows” that Chief Justice John Marshall and the U.S. Supreme Court
“established” or “created” the power of judicial review in the case of Marbury v. Madison in
1803. 1 The Marbury case is now one of the foundation stones of Marshall’s historical legacy. It
stands near the center of what makes Marshall the great chief justice. As the power of
constitutional review has spread and courts have struggled to win their independence and gain
respect from other political actors, Marbury has taken on a global stature. 2
Marbury’s place in the constitutional canon is secure. Scholars at the turn of the
twentieth century heatedly debated whether John Marshall had used the case to foist judicial
review on an unsuspecting nation or whether he merely followed the logic of the law and laid
bare the constitutional foundations of the new republic. 3 The debate was seemingly premised on
the self-evident importance of Marbury itself. There is perhaps no greater declaration of
Marbury’s importance than the U.S. Supreme Court’s invocation of the case in the middle of the
twentieth century, at the tail end of the Little Rock desegregation crisis. In responding to the
Arkansas governor and legislature, the unanimous Supreme Court thought it “necessary only to
recall some basic constitutional propositions which are settled doctrine.” Quoting Marbury to
the effect that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is,” the Court added its gloss “that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the
law of the Constitution.” 4 This was a contentious reading of Marbury to be sure, but scholars at
mid-century shared the Court’s view that Marbury was fundamental. 5 Civics and history
textbooks, including those written by Supreme Court justices, have followed along, declaring
that Marbury “established” 6 the Court’s “role as guardian of the Constitution.” 7
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A recent revisionist literature on Marbury has challenged that received wisdom, however.
Revisionists have questioned the importance of Marbury in establishing judicial review, the
originality of its arguments, and the scope of the power that Marshall was claiming for the Court.
Such work has led the constitutional historian Michael Klarman “to prompt other scholars to
reconsider prevalent assumptions about the importance of canonical Supreme Court rulings
generally and the ‘great’ Marshall Court decisions specifically.” 8
This study contributes to the Marbury revisionism by examining how and when the case
entered the constitutional canon. In particular, this study takes up Robert Lowry Clinton’s
influential claim that Marbury was “little noticed during the first century of our national
existence.” 9 The key evidence that Clinton marshals for this startling conclusion is data on
citations to Marbury in subsequent U.S. Supreme Court opinions. Clinton’s initial finding
helped launch a great deal of the revisionist literature on Marbury, but the basic empirical claim
itself has been taken as a given and has not been subject to much additional scrutiny, analysis or
extension. 10
This article reconsiders the reception and influence of Marbury by dramatically
expanding the evidentiary base. We reconsider the quantity and quality of citation data to
Marbury in the U.S. Supreme Court. More importantly, we examine the reception of Marbury in
the lower federal courts and the state supreme courts across American history. It is quite
possible that Marbury was recognized in nineteenth century legal culture as having “established”
the power of judicial review even if it was rarely cited for that proposition by the U.S. Supreme
Court in its own opinions. We likewise examine references to Marbury in legislative and
executive documents. Finally, we examine the treatment of Marbury in legal treatises and
commentaries in the nineteenth century to gauge both the reception of the case and the beginning
of its transition into the constitutional canon.
Our analysis gives a much more complete picture of when and how Marbury entered into
the constitutional canon and how the case has been deployed by the courts. Our findings modify
the view that Marbury was “little noticed” by the courts for most of the nineteenth century. The
legal commentary of the period show that Marbury was not widely regarded as a special case
that “won for the Supreme Court the power to construe the Constitution with finality . . . [and]
made the Court’s interpretation binding on all others.” 11 More accurate is the phrasing of a recent
textbook, which characterizes Marbury as simply “enunciate[ing] the doctrine of judicial
review.” 12 Nonetheless, a Federalist narrative of a herculean Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury
was being laid down in the early republic that would eventually become integrated into a
standard narrative of the case. The rhetorical use of Marbury to bolster the authority of the
judiciary as a constitutional interpreter is a distinctly twentieth century phenomenon and follows
clear patterns of legal and political conflict in the various levels of American courts. Judging by
the use of the case by the courts, one might well say that it was Brown v. Board of Education13
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and its aftermath that truly brought Marbury into the constitutional canon in its modern form. 14
Cooper v. Aaron 15 transformed Marbury into the modern symbol of judicial power, and elevated
a different dimension of John Marshall’s argument into the standard judicial and legal rhetoric of
the late twentieth century.
Marbury has a particular meaning and significance for us in the early twenty-first
century, and the case occupies an especially prominent place in the modern constitutional canon.
Marbury did not always have the same resonance that it does today. It took time to convert
Marbury into a case primarily about judicial review, to elevate Marbury above a variety of other
sources from the early republic as the standard citation for the authority of courts to interpret and
enforce constitutional limits, and to suggest that Marbury was not merely a case in which the
Supreme Court exercised or explained the power of judicial review but somehow created or
established the power of judicial review. As the power of judicial review became more salient to
the constitutional and political system and more contested, judges and commentators turned to
the powerful rhetoric of John Marshall to help legitimate the institution to new generations.
The first section of the article reviews the revisionist case regarding Marbury. The
second steps back to consider the broader idea of the constitutional canon. The third section
examines citation data on Marbury in the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. circuit courts, and the
state supreme courts. The fourth section reviews congressional and executive references to
Marbury, and the fifth section examines nineteenth century legal commentary on the Marbury
case.
I. Marbury Revisionism
II. The Rhetoric of Judicial Authority and Constitutional Canons

III. Judicial Citations to Marbury
In order to gain a more complete picture of when and how Marbury entered into the
constitutional canon and how the case has been deployed by the courts, an examination of the
quantity and quality of citations to Marbury is necessary. The sheer quantity of citations to
Marbury can serve as one indicator for when the case became historically important and entered
the constitutional canon. It can also serve to illustrate the way in which the judiciary has
employed Marbury over time. The quality of the Marbury citations and the degree to which they
are used for judicial review rather than for jurisdictional holdings or for the implications of the
mandamus power can also tell the story of when Marbury was transformed from being a case
that made a variety of substantively important holdings about constitutional law and statutory
interpretation to a case that made judicial review possible.
In the following discussion, we give particular attention to three distinct time periods
where the literature suggests different patterns in the judiciary’s level of citation and qualitative
use of Marbury. The first time period encompasses the first century after Marbury was handed
down. As noted above, Clinton and others have argued that Marbury was “little noticed” during
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this period and therefore we would expect few citations to the case. 16 Furthermore, we do not
expect these citations to be for the judiciary’s authority to exercise a power of judicial review,
but instead for such matters as jurisdiction and the use of the writ of mandamus. The second time
period extends from the centennial anniversary of Marbury in 1903 which was designed to draw
increased attention to both the case and Chief Justice John Marshall until Cooper v. Aaron was
handed down in 1958. Marbury revisionists have suggested that it was the efforts of the
conservative bar to celebrate Marbury in the midst of Lochner era controversies that spurred a
transformation in the historical importance of the case, which would suggest a rise of citations
and shift in the nature of citations at the turn of the century. Finally, the third time period runs
from the year Cooper v. Aaron was handed down in 1958 to the present. It is appropriate that the
Court’s strong exposition of judicial authority in Cooper v. Aaron, famously pointing back to
Marshall’s declaration in Marbury that “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is” while declaring that the Court’s decisions were supreme and
binding on the other branches of government, marks the beginning of this period. The Court’s
powerful declaration of judicial supremacy in Cooper v. Aaron as well as the judiciary’s
increasingly frequent exercise of judicial authority during this time period might itself be
expected to mark a distinct break in the judicial rhetoric regarding Marbury and judicial review.
In order to study the judiciary’s changing tendency to cite Marbury, we created an
original dataset of federal and state cases citing Marbury. This comprehensive approach of
looking at all Marbury citations has important advantages over previous scholarship. Previous
analyses have relied heavily on evidence from the U.S. Supreme Court to draw conclusions
about Marbury’s prominence, but the Court is only one source of evidence for juridical
perceptions of the case and its citation patterns in the nineteenth century may well have been
idiosyncratic (Chief Justice John Marshall himself often neglected to cite relevant precedents). 17
A broader analysis of the Court’s entire history and of the lower federal courts and the state
courts provides a more comprehensive basis for drawing conclusions about the reception and use
of Marbury in the legal community and its significance as a source of authority in judicial
argument. Evidence from state courts and lower federal courts might be expected to cut against
Clinton’s findings, since states often needed to initiate and justify judicial review in their own
constitutional systems (and thus might be expected to cite Marbury if it were thought to be a
significant authority for such a power) and lower federal courts might be expected to cite a
prominent, authoritative case of their own superior court. We can better gauge Marbury’s
importance over time by assembling a comprehensive, systematic portrait of when and how it
was used.
The original dataset was constructed using both Westlaw Campus and Lexis Nexis. A
“KeyCite” or “Shepardization” search as well as a keyword search for “Marbury w/2 Madison”
was used to construct a comprehensive list of citations in the Supreme Court, federal circuit
courts, and state courts. Any citation, including those in majority, concurring, and dissenting
opinions as well as references by counsel in the case were included.
16
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[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The first step in the analysis focuses on any case that makes a specific reference to
Marbury v. Madison, regardless of the nature of the case making the citation. The results are
shown in Figure 1 (using a centered, five-year moving average to smooth the year-to-year
fluctuations). The judicial citation data partly reinforce and partly modify expectations from the
existing literature. As expected, the citation pattern shows a marked increase in the rate of
citation to Marbury in the Supreme Court, circuit courts, and state courts over time, with the
number of citations being relatively low and sporadic until the twentieth century.
The citation behavior of the state and federal circuit courts reinforce the evidence from
the U.S. Supreme Court and indicate that Marbury took on a new significance in the twentieth
century. From 1803-1901, before Marbury came to prominence as a judicial review case,
citations to Marbury were relatively infrequent but not rare with the Supreme Court citing
Marbury an average of only .88 times a year while the federal circuit courts and state courts cited
Marbury .52 and 4.56 average times a year, respectively. During the second time period, from
1903-1957, the judiciary was slightly more likely to cite Marbury. The Supreme Court cited
Marbury an average of 1.05 times a year and the federal circuit courts and states courts cited
Marbury on average 1.89 and 7.00 times a year from 1902 to 1957. These averages obscure a
noticeable but short-lived wave of Marbury citations at the turn of the twentieth century,
especially in the U.S. Supreme Court. The increased salience of Marbury at the turn of the
century is consistent with the current literature, which has taken note of both the newfound
significance of judicial review during the Lochner era and the self-conscious celebration of the
centennial of Marbury by conservative lawyers. 18 Such efforts may have helped transform the
perception of Marbury, but their direct influence on the judiciary was not so enduring and by the
New Deal citations to Marbury dropped to nineteenth-century levels. 19
The rate that the judiciary cited Marbury exploded during the third time period from
1958-2008, with the Supreme Court leading the way and the state supreme courts and federal
circuit courts following after a brief lag. The average number of citations per year to Marbury
during this time period was 3.04 in the Supreme Court, 22.51 in the federal circuit courts, and
18.98 in the state courts. While the increase was very significant in all of the courts, it was the
most dramatic in the circuit courts. The percent increase in average citations per year from period
2 to period 3 was 190% in the Supreme Court, 1091% in the federal circuit courts, and 171% in
the state courts.
If Figure 1 reveals that Marbury became increasingly prominent in the twentieth century,
it also reveals the fact that Marbury was a notable case in the nineteenth century as well.
Marbury was frequently cited in both the U.S. Supreme Court and the state courts in nineteenth
century, though not at the levels it would reach in the twentieth century. Marbury did not sit in
obscurity over the course of the nineteenth century, but rather made an appearance in dozens of
cases. The revisionists too often underplay the extent to which Marbury was a well-known case
18
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in the nineteenth century. The question that Figure 1 raises is how Marbury was used by the
courts, in the nineteenth century and beyond.
As a second step, we supplement the citation analysis with a content analysis of the cases
citing Marbury. Crucial to Clinton’s argument is that Supreme Court rarely cited Marbury in the
nineteenth century, and those few cites did not reference the power of judicial review or use the
case as an authority for the power of judicial review. 20 Figures 2 and 3 report the results of a
comparable but broader content analysis of cases citing Marbury.
[Insert Figure 2 & Figure 3 about here]
In order to understand when Marbury became important for its judicial review
component, we conduct a content analysis of these citations in the Supreme Court, federal circuit
courts, and state courts. All U.S. Supreme Court opinions and a stratified, random sample of state
supreme court and federal circuit court opinions citing Marbury were coded as providing
authority for the power of judicial review or for some other proposition. In Figure 2, we show
that the rate at which Marbury was cited specifically for judicial review in the Supreme Court,
federal circuit courts, and states courts over time.
Figure 2 shows that Marbury was regularly cited as authority for judicial review in the
nineteenth century, but at relatively low levels. This use of Marbury is easily missed unless the
analysis is expanded beyond the U.S. Supreme Court. Comparing Figure 1 to Figure 2 shows a
sharp reduction in number of cases citing Marbury, but a generally similar pattern across time
between overall citations and judicial review-specific citations. Figure 2 does show a distinct
flattening of judicial review citations in the nineteenth century compared to Figure 1, however,
and highlights the temporary surge in Marbury citations at the turn of the century not only in the
U.S. Supreme Court but also in the state supreme courts. It also suggests the significance of the
centennial activities and the Lochner-style controversies in increasing the salience of Marbury as
an authority for judicial review. The justices on the Vinson Court make scattered and modest
use of Marbury, often in dissent, but the turning point in Marbury’s prominence in judicial
rhetoric in the postwar period came in Cooper.
Figure 3 further illuminates these relationships. In Figure 3 we show the percentage of
citations to Marbury that are for judicial review, organized by type of court and by time period.
Most notably, Figure 3 reveals what Figure 2 can only suggest – the proportion of Marburyciting cases that cite it as an authority for judicial review, and how that proportion has changed
over time. In the Supreme Court, we found that only 8% of Marbury citations during the first
time period were for judicial review. This doubled to 16% during the second time period and
rose again to 43% during the period after Cooper v. Aaron. The federal circuit courts followed a
broadly similar pattern. They started from higher base, with 16% of Marbury citations in the
nineteenth century using the case as support for the power of judicial review, with a comparable
citation pattern in the first half of the twentieth century. In the post-Cooper period, however, the
proportion of judicial review citations increased to more than a third of all Marbury citations (a
statistically significant difference at the .05 level). The pattern in the state courts borrows from
both the circuit courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. The baseline in the nineteenth century is
relatively high, but the proportion of judicial review citations increases in a step-wise fashion
across the twentieth century. Marbury citations for judicial review made up 15% of citations
during the first time period, 27% during the second time period, and 46% during the final time
20
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period (both differences are statistically significant at the .05 level). A comparison of Figure 2
and Figure 3 reveals that, though each type of court does cite Marbury as an authority for judicial
review in the nineteenth century in a non-trivial percentage of its cases citing Marbury, most of
those judicial review references come decades after the case was handed down, in the latter part
of the nineteenth century.
One issue worth considering is the relationship between the exercise of judicial review
and citations to Marbury. As the literature of judicial displays of authority suggest, we might
expect judges to be more likely to make reference to a case like Marbury when the political
stakes are high and the legitimacy of the court’s action is likely to be questioned. 21 This might
suggest that the Court will cite Marbury more when it strikes down statutes and is otherwise at
risk of being labeled “activist.” More fundamentally, cases involving questions of the
constitutionality of statutes may create opportunities for the Court to cite Marbury as an
authority for the doctrine of judicial review. If the Court is not exercising the power of judicial
review, there may be little opportunity or reason to cite Marbury. These relationships are harder
to test for the lower federal courts and the state courts, due to data limitations, so we focus on the
U.S. Supreme Court. 22 As expected, there is a small but positive relationship between citations
to Marbury by the Court and the number of times that the Court strikes down federal laws in that
year (at the .05 level). 23 Moreover, there is a substantively small but similarly positive
relationship between citations and total number of cases reviewing federal statutes (at the .05
level). 24 These relationships are not stable across history, however. The correlation between
citations to Marbury and cases striking down federal laws is stronger in the twentieth century, 25
but loses statistical significance in the nineteenth century. 26 A reverse pattern occurs with cases
upholding federal legislation against constitutional challenge. Marbury citations are correlated
with such cases in the nineteenth century, 27 but not across the period as a whole. 28 On the whole,
there is not a strong correlation between the exercise of judicial review and citations to Marbury
by the Supreme Court, and the Court frequently exercises the power of judicial review without
citing Marbury. The presence of judicial review cases on the Court’s agenda may create
opportunities (and incentives) for the Court to cite Marbury, but the effect is a weak one.
IV. Congressional and Executive References to Marbury

V. Early Commentary on Marbury
Both judicial citation patterns and evidence from congressional and executive documents
support the notion that Marbury was known within the political and legal community in the
nineteenth century but was not exclusively or even primarily known as a case about judicial
review. Marbury’s importance and identity changed over time, however. Marbury became a
21
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more prominent, more frequently cited case in judicial and political debates in the twentieth
century, particularly in the late twentieth century, and those references increasingly focused on
Marbury’s relevance to the power of judicial review.
Although judges may have particular reason to look for authorities to support their
exercises of judicial review, they are not the only representatives of the legal culture who could
recognize or construct the significance of Marbury. If judges did not cite Marbury on judicial
review to any great degree until well into the twentieth century, it remains to be determined how
the case was substantively discussed. It is through these substantive discussions that the path of
canonization can be traced.
This section incorporates a variety of authors who discussed Marbury, primarily treatise
writers but also judges, memorialists, and legislators, in order to further unpack the meaning of
Figures 1 and 2. 29 The focus is on the nineteenth century, for that is where the qualitative
transformation takes place in the understanding of Marbury. It is clear that by the early
twentieth century, Marbury is a much discussed part of the constitutional canon and at the heart
of debates about the power of judicial review. 30 The question raised by Clinton and other
revisionists is whether Marbury had this status from the beginning. In order to investigate the
revisionist claims, we should examine how Marbury was discussed and used in the nineteenth
century and when the characterization of Marbury as a case about establishment of judicial
review begins take on its familiar, modern form.
Marbury was immediately recognized as a case that was relevant to the power of judicial
review. It was not, however, generally held up as being a foundational case that uniquely or
critically established the power of judicial review. For many nineteenth century commentators,
Marbury was simply part of the general constitutional landscape. There were early exceptions
such as Joseph Story who did highlight Marbury and John Marshall’s role in empowering the
courts, 31 and they developed a narrative that would become commonplace by the end of the
century.
There was little contemporaneous reaction to John Marshall’s assertion of the power of
judicial review in Marbury. As the Supreme Court historian Charles Warren thoroughly
documented, Marbury was a high-profile case and generated substantial public discussion and
controversy. 32 Public comment at the time revolved around other questions raised by the case,
most notably the chief justice’s assertion that the courts could monitor and correct how cabinet
members conducted their duties. The near silence surrounding the discussion of judicial review
in Marbury is in sharp contrast to the public notice taken of the power during earlier
controversies and after earlier decisions, including the determination by the federal circuit courts
in the 1790s that provisions of the Invalid Pensions Act was unconstitutional.
The opinion had high prestige and salience in the nineteenth century from the political
and administrative law context. As Figure 1 illustrates, Marbury was routinely discussed in the
courts in the nineteenth century, but for the substantive content that is frequently ignored today.
It was in this context that Justice Joseph Story extolled the case in a circuit court opinion as “the
great case of Marbury v. Madison . . . great, not only from the authority which pronounced it, but
29
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also from the importance of the topics which it discussed.” 33 Similarly, when state judges wrote
paeans to the “celebrated case” 34 of Marbury and talked about it as “one of the ablest arguments
of Chief Justice Marshall,” it was not for his establishment of the power of judicial review but
for his substantive defense of the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts and the prohibition on
legislatures “imposing on those Courts a succession of new duties.” 35 In 1860, Republican
Representative James Hale sought to deflate judicial prestige a bit and so reminded his
colleagues of the “famous case” of Marbury because it represented a great clash between the
chief justice and the president over the mandamus power and the completion of commissions.36
Marbury revisionists have had a tendency to downplay the nineteenth-century significance of the
case, but such casual references by judges and legislators to the “great case” of Marbury should
temper that inclination. Marbury was memorable for many things, and many nineteenth-century
commentators focused on the politics surrounding the case or the substantive matters of law
discussed in Marshall’s opinion when recalling the case and tracing its lessons. Those traits made
it an attractive candidate for transmission and canonization when interest did eventually turn to
judicial review. 37
As the revisionists would expect, the earliest cases that took note of Marbury at all as a
precedent for judicial review did not tend to give inordinate attention to it. U.S. District Court
judge John Davis, for example, treated Marbury in a two-sentence footnote in his opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the Jeffersonian embargo in United States v. The William
(1808). 38 Davis did not seem to think there was any question to be raised about “the duty of the
court” to make a “comparison of the law with the constitution.” But the question of whether the
courts could properly invalidate legislation “without repugnancy to express provisions of the
constitution” was more difficult, and Davis canvassed a range of authorities to illuminate that
issue. He gave sustained attention to various circuit court and Supreme Court decisions from the
1790s that had evaluated the constitutionality of state and federal laws. Marbury simply was in
“affirmance of the general doctrine, exhibited in the cases cited in the text.” 39 Similarly, the
South Carolina Constitutional Court of Appeals included Marbury as part of a string cite along
with other state and federal cases and St. George Tucker’s Commentaries 40 in support of the
proposition that each “department of the government, is the constitutional judge of its own
powers; each within its own sphere” and that judges are bound to “refuse to execute” statutes
“contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution.” 41 Pennsylvania’s court similarly emphasized
33
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Tucker’s treatise and Justice Patterson’s circuit court opinion in Vanhorne’s Lessee v.
Dorrance 42 before adding that Marshall’s opinion in Marbury “strengthened and confirmed the
sentiments I have ever entertained” (the defense counsel had noted that the power of judicial
review “had been repeatedly affirmed by judicial decisions” but did not include Marbury in his
list of authorities). 43
As time passed, both lawyers and judges included Marbury in a fluctuating list of state
and federal cases and extrajudicial materials that provided authority for the proposition that
unconstitutional acts were null and void. Often, Marbury was simply part of a lengthy string cite
as in the New Hampshire case of Merrill v. Sheburne (1818) 44 or the Louisiana case of Louisiana
Ice Co. v. State National Bank (1880). 45 Sometimes, Marbury was named as part of a shorter list
of examples of courts exercising the power of judicial review or even allowed to stand on its
own, but unadorned with any description of its particular importance in establishing judicial
review. For example, the Indiana case Dawson v. Shaver (1822) matter of factly cited Emerick
and Marbury to support its point that “the duty of the Court is imperative, and its authority is
unquestionable” to declare unconstitutional statutory provisions null and void. 46 U.S. District
Judge Robert Wells included Marbury along with Vanhorne’s Lessee and the Federalist Papers
to lend support for “the principles intended to be established by the framers of the constitution;
and . . . established judicial principles” when writing one of the few antebellum lower court
opinions declaring a federal law unconstitutional and making one of the very few nineteenth
century references to Marbury for the power of judicial review in a federal court opinion. 47
Legislators showed a similar tendency through first decades of the nineteenth-century, when they
referenced Marbury in relation to judicial review. During the South Carolina nullification
debate, for example, Senator Miles Poindexter asserted that “[a]ll parties agreed” at the time of
the founding that unconstitutional laws were “absolutely null and void,” and he pointed out that
this “principle has often been recognized by judicial decisions, both in the federal and the State
courts.” Marbury was simply one of several cases “on this point.” 48 During the Reconstruction
debates, Senator Reverdy Johnson leaped to correct the suggestion that there had been doubts at
the time of the founding about the power of judicial review and similarly emphasized the myriad
statements and decisions in support of such a power. Marshall’s careful exposition of the power
in Marbury was “for the purpose, not of satisfying the minds of the court that they had the power
to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional, but to satisfy the public mind” that they had done
“their duty” while exercising such a power. 49 By the mid-nineteenth century, however, some
judges had already found Marshall’s language to be particularly quotable, and Marbury was cited
not for its importance but for its eloquence. Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court provides an extended
excerpt from the case with the preface, “Chief Justice Marshall lays down the doctrine in the
following clear, pointed and forcible language.” 50
But there were isolated exceptions in the state courts in the early nineteenth century that
seemed to attribute greater significance to Marbury. Judge John D. Cook, a short-tenured Whig
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on the Missouri Supreme Court, sounded an exceptionally modern note at the conclusion of his
opinion in Baily v. Gentry (1822), “Since the case of Marbury v. Madison . . . this question [of
the judicial authority to decide “on the validity of the acts of the Legislature”] has been generally
looked upon as settled.” 51 Somewhat more ambiguously, in an early alcohol prohibition case the
Indiana Supreme Court rebutted the suggestion of the state’s attorneys that the safety of the
people was the supreme law by observing that there were constitutional barriers to legislative
power that the judiciary was obliged to enforce and that “[t]his duty of the judicial department, in
this country, was demonstrated by chief justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison . . . and has
since been recognized as settled American law.” 52 This sort of “since Marbury” rhetoric is
familiar to modern ears, especially after Cooper, but such characterizations of Marbury were
uncommon in the early nineteenth century. Somewhat differently, Pennsylvania’s Judge John
Gibson famously singled out Marbury for special criticism in his opinion in Eakin v. Raub
(1825), contending that “although the right in question [“to declare all unconstitutional acts
void”] has long been claimed by the judiciary, no judge has ventured to discuss it, except Chief
Justice Marshall.” 53
But Gibson’s idiosyncratic dissent had little influence with his
contemporaries until it was recovered and given new attention and status by James Bradley
Thayer and other scholars concerned with Marbury and the history of judicial review at the turn
of the twentieth century. 54 Even these ambiguous statements of Marbury’s significance were
highly unusual in the nineteenth century judiciary. These three references were very much the
exceptions to the more common pattern noted above, and collectively they were hardly clear in
indicating a belief that John Marshall had created or established a power of judicial review.
[Insert Figures 5 and 6 about here]
Marbury was a common example of the judicial review power, but it had not been
generally elevated by nineteenth-century judges to canonical status for that point. Figures 5 and
6 shed additional light on the process by which Marbury gained new significance in the courts.
Figure 5 traces the fate of some of the competing candidates for canonization as the preferred
cite for the power of judicial review. The figure includes all citations in state and federal courts
to several federal cases that were commonly included in early string cites on the power for
judicial review, including Hylton, 55 Vanhorne’s, 56 Hayburn’s, 57 Calder, 58 and Marbury. The
early importance of Marbury as “the mandamus case” gave it a salience and staying power that
carried it through the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, other cases that had been routinely paired
with Marbury or overshadowed it relative to the power of judicial review were less cited for
other points of law and gradually dropped from judicial opinions as leading precedents for the
power of courts to nullify unconstitutional laws. No single state case ever achieved the same
universality of reference as the federal cases, and extrajudicial sources passed in and out of favor
over time.
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Part of the explanation for the rise of Marbury appears to be its quotability. As string
cites on the authority of courts to exercise the power of judicial review declined, favored quotes
from Marbury took over. Here too, however, Marshall proved to be a man for all seasons. As
Figure 6 illustrates, judges up until the New Deal favored Marshall’s bold language on
unchanging constitutional limits on legislative power. This was the John Marshall featured in In
re Jacobs (1885), the landmark New York labor regulation case that helped launch the Lochner
era. 59 In recent decades, by contrast, judges have overwhelmingly favored Marshall’s sentence
singled out in Cooper on the judicial authority to say what the law is. A post-1980s resurgence
in Marshallian language on constitutional limitations is visible in Figure 6 as well, reflecting
renewed interest in the courts in the possibility of enforcing enumerated powers. Marshall’s line
about the Constitution being a “superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means” sits
comfortably with both an emphasis on constitutional limits and on judicial supremacy, and it has
been a less prominent but steady presence in judicial opinions since the Lochner era.
The treatise literature of the nineteenth century dealt with Marbury in a comparable
manner. 60 A review of the major works of the period reveals that Marbury was not generally
treated with the special reverence that it gets in the twentieth century. In his influential digest of
all federal court decisions, Richard Peters included twenty-four numbered paragraphs on
“general principles” relating to the constitutionality of statutes and judicial review. 61 Only three
of those paragraphs were drawn from Marbury, and he led the section with excerpts from
Vanhorne’s Lessee. Likewise, Nathan Dane’s earlier digest of American law included Marbury
in a string cite on the judicial duty to declare unconstitutional statutes void. 62 By contrast, in his
digest limited to Supreme Court decisions, Justice Benjamin Curtis simply cited Marbury for the
first proposition under his constitutional law heading: “An act of congress repugnant to the
constitution is not law.” 63
Early constitutional commentaries were matter of fact about the judicial authority to
interpret the Constitution and set aside unconstitutional statutory requirements. Marbury was not
generally identified as playing a pivotal or foundational role in the creation or development of
the power of judicial review in the major treatises of the first decades of the nineteenth century
(with two significant exceptions to be discussed below). In his law lectures, Henry St. George
Tucker observed that the “power to pronounce a law unconstitutional has been ably and
successfully maintained on some memorable occasions,” and listed several examples but
provided an extended quote from Marbury since in “that case the argument is condensed by
Judge Marshall with his usual force.” 64 In the second published edition of his constitutional law
lectures at Columbia, William Duer added an extended footnote with precedents for courts
declaring acts of legislatures “void as against the Constitution.”65 He did not include Marbury in
his list, and the authority that he chose to discuss in the body of his original lecture was
Federalist No. 78. William Rawle listed without particular reliance on authority the judicial
power to enforce the Constitution as one of the checks on legislative power. 66 John Norton
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Pomeroy defended the role of the judiciary as the “final arbiter as to the meaning of the
Constitution,” but did not rely on specific precedents to make the point. “In fact, the whole
history of the Supreme Court is an authority.” For “important and leading cases,” in which the
issue was examined with “a cogency of argument which never has been, and never can be,
answered,” Pomeroy pointed the reader to several opinions, not including Marbury. 67 Thomas
Cooley feared “wearying the patience of the reader in quoting from the very numerous
authorities upon the subject,” and pointed the reader to a number of judicial and extrajudicial
sources, including Marbury, but provided in that text an extended quotation from a speech by
Daniel Webster. 68 Rawle and other treatise writers did take note of the substantive significance
of Marbury as a statement about the constitutional jurisdiction of the courts and the mandamus
power. 69
Published obituaries and eulogies at the time of Marshall’s death largely avoided detailed
discussions of his work on the Court or references to individual cases, but they did not portray
Marbury as among his significant accomplishments or the power of judicial review as an
unsettled question at the time of his ascension to the Court. Horace Binney’s (1835) eulogy may
have been the most popular, however, and it alludes to a variety of important decisions that
settled disputed constitutional questions and that were “not to be shaken so long as the law has
any portion of our regard.” 70 Marbury was not among them. Binney did not suggest that judicial
review was an open question when Marshall assumed the position of chief justice, or that
establishing the power of judicial review was among his accomplishments. Instead, Binney
more modestly observes that at the time of Marshall’s appointment “in many parts of the greatest
difficulty and delicacy, [the Constitution] had not then received a judicial interpretation.” 71 The
judicial “rules of interpretation were still to be settled, and the meaning of its doubtful clauses to
be fixed.” 72 Similarly, in his eulogy for Marshall, James Bryant took it for granted that it was the
“prerogative and duty” of the Court to “test” statutes against the requirements of the
Constitution. 73 The praise owed to Marshall was not in creating or establishing such a power but
in how he exercised the responsibility with which he had been entrusted. Marbury was observed
only for the purposes of illuminating Marshall’s self-restraint, in “refusing to exercise a
prerogative” granted to him by Congress but unauthorized by the Constitution. 74
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James Kent and Joseph Story were two notable exceptions in laying the groundwork for
the canonization of Marbury. Personal friends and ideological allies, they both wrote highly
influential treatises that appeared near the end of Marshall’s tenure on the Court, whom they held
in great admiration. In his Commentaries on American Law, Kent provides a lengthy discourse
on judicial review. Not only did the “courts of justice have a right, and are in duty bound, to
bring every law to the test of the constitution” but the “judicial department is the proper power in
the government to determine whether the statute be or be not constitutional.” 75 Only by
exercising “the exalted duty of expounding the constitution, and trying the validity of statutes by
that standard” will the courts be able to protect the people from “undue and destructive
innovations upon their chartered rights.” 76 Kent thought this to be “a settled principle in the
legal polity of this country,” and he traced its “progress” from The Federalist Papers through
judicial decisions in the federal circuit and state courts. 77 His narrative culminates in Marbury.
Until 1803, “this question . . . was confined to one or two of the state courts, and to the
subordinate, or circuit courts of the United States.” Only in Marbury did the question receive
“clear and elaborate discussion” by the “Supreme Court of the United States” and only then was
the power “declared in an argument approaching to the precision and certainty of a mathematical
demonstration.” After that, Kent concluded, the “great question may be regarded as now finally
settled.” 78 Kent importantly introduces the notion that Marbury “settled” the question of judicial
review. Kent does not, however, give any indication that the power of judicial review was
particularly contested prior to Marbury or that John Marshall exercised some creative force in
establishing it. His key point of contrast is between “the English government” and “this
country,” and the primary virtue attributed to Marshall’s opinion is to its “clear and elaborate
discussion” of the important subject. 79 Kent concludes his discussion of the power of judicial
review by emphasizing that there had never been “any doubt or difficulty in this state, in respect
to the competency of the courts to declare a statute unconstitutional.” 80 Kent did not indicate
whether there had ever been “any doubt or difficulty” in any other state.
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story took a similar view of the judicial
power. “The universal sense of America has decided, that in the last resort the judiciary must
decide upon the constitutionality of the acts and laws of the general and state governments.”81
By firmly and independently doing so, the courts could “subdue the oppression of the other
branches of the government.” 82 To support his point, Story offered an extended excerpt from
Federalist No. 78 and Marbury, observing that the “reasoning of the Supreme Court . . . on this
subject is so clear and convincing, that it is deemed advisable to cite it in this place, as a
corrective to those loose and extraordinary doctrines, which sometimes find their way into
opinions possessing official influence.” 83 Even more than Kent, however, Story was writing
75
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with the Jacksonians and specifically the threat of state nullification in mind. Neither Kent nor
Story were content to merely observe the existence of the power of judicial review, they wanted
to celebrate it and emphasize it. For Kent, the power was crucial to “constitutional liberty, and
of the security of property in this country,” and thus worth an extended discussion. 84 For Story,
the authority of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution was under threat from other
institutions, and so the basis of judicial review needed emphasis to combat those “extraordinary
doctrines.” As a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court writing specifically on the U.S. Constitution,
Story was perhaps more inclined to quote from his friend John Marshall’s opinion in Marbury
and to leave out references to state cases of the sort that Chancellor Kent included in his more
general treatise.
Some legislators in the Civil War era went even further in suggesting that Marbury was a
special case in the history of judicial review, but they did not always seek to praise the work that
Marshall had done. Fueled by lingering concerns over Dred Scott and the constitutionality of
war and Reconstruction measures, Republican Charles Drake used his brief time in the U.S.
Senate to propose eliminating the power of judicial review. He singled out Marbury as the
“leading case” that gave “authoritative exposition of the grounds upon which the dogma rests.”
This “judicial claim . . . rests wholly upon an interpretation of its own power by the judiciary,
coupled with the unobjecting silence of the legislative department,” but Congress had slept
during “this first attempt by the judiciary to disregard its laws” given the insignificance of the
statutory provision at issue. 85 Drake was a anti-judicial review gadfly, and he had good reason to
minimize Court’s authority to exercise the power of judicial review. He anticipated later
progressive critics of the Court in singling out Marbury as unique and as the illegitimate
wellspring of the power of judicial review. But he was not completely alone among
congressmen in highlighting Marbury. In the previous Congress, Democratic Representative
James Beck had pointed to Marbury as the case in which “the Supreme Court had defined its
own powers and announced what its duties, privileges, and rights are whenever Congress
attempts to pass any unconstitutional act,” and read an extended excerpt from Marshall’s opinion
as part of his warning that a Reconstruction measure was unconstitutional. 86 Unlike Drake, Beck
had not objection to the Court playing its role, but he agreed with Drake in characterizing
Marbury as the source of its power. 87 Such claims for the uniqueness or foundational quality of
Marbury were still not common among legislators during the period, but it is striking that they
had begun to emerge at all.
In the late nineteenth century, the significance of Marbury in establishing the power of
judicial review became a more prominent theme. As the power of judicial review became more
salient and more contested in the second half of the century, commentators began to suggest that
the question of whether the courts had such a power had once been open but had been
84
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permanently closed by Marshall’s decisive action. 88 George van Santvoord’s popular Sketches of
Lives of the Chief Justices was initially published just before the Civil War, but republished in a
highly successful new editions in the decades after. He praised Marbury as “[o]ne of the most
important of these cases of constitutional construction, as it is the earliest in point of time,” and
containing an argument that “has ever since been regarded as the fundamental principle, the very
sheet anchor of the Constitution, namely, that it is the right and the duty of the judicial
department to determine the constitutionality of a legislative act.” Although van Santvoord
admitted that “this principle had, indeed, been asserted at an earlier period” by other judges, he
offered what would become an influential claim about the importance of Marbury. Van
Santvoord asserted that despite Dorrance, et al., “it does not appear to have been considered by
the professional mind as settled.” 89 As evidence, he pointed to Justice Samuel Chase to suggest
that the power of judicial review was an open question in 1803. Chase had hedged in Calder v.
Bull (1798), a case involving a challenge to a state law under a state constitution, “Without
giving an opinion, at this time, whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide that any law made by
Congress is void, I am fully satisfied that this Court has no jurisdiction to determine that any law
of any State Legislature contrary to any Constitution of such State is void.” 90 He had likewise
said in a circuit court opinion of Cooper v. Telfair that “all acts of the Legislature in direct
opposition to the provisions of the Constitution would be void; yet it still remains a question
where the power resides to declare them void” (emphasis added by van Santvoord). Van
Santvoord carefully neglected to quote Chase’s next sentence in that opinion, in which he
observed that although “there is no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon this point” as
of 1800 (the court reporter would later add a footnote taking account of Marbury), the existence
of the power of judicial review was “expressly admitted by all this bar,” had been individually
ruled on by Supreme Court justices sitting in circuit, and was not thought to be in doubt by
Chase himself. Chase agreed “in the general sentiment” of “the period, when the existing
constitution came into operation” that the judiciary could declare unconstitutional acts void.91
Nonetheless, van Santvoord leveraged Chase’s words in cases that had frequently been cited as
authorities for the power of judicial review to build up the importance of Marbury as “the first
authoritative exposition of the Court on the subject” and a “final decision” that “put the question
at rest then and for ever.” 92 Van Santvoord’s biographical account of Marshall and his rendition
of Marbury’s significance became a standard reference in the latter nineteenth century, being
cited and quoted on this proposition by publications ranging from the Albany Law Journal 93 to
Appleton’s Cyclopedia of American Biography 94 to Edward Elliott’s Biographical Story of the
Constitution. 95 This led Hampton Carson in his official centennial history of the Court to
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characterize Marbury as “subjecting, once and forever, all executive and ministerial officers as
well as Congress itself to the control of the Court.” 96
The clarity and source of Marbury was now thought to take on particular significance.
Whereas earlier commentators had grouped a wide range of sources as offering support for the
power of courts to give binding interpretations of constitutions and declare statutes void, Carson
characterized all earlier decisions as “slow, timid, and halting footsteps” that would culminate in
the authoritative pronouncement by John Marshall in Marbury. 97 The pioneering political
scientist W.W. Willoughby took note of earlier cases declaring laws unconstitutional, but what
was important was that “in 1803 . . . the principle was first definitely and clearly applied by the
Supreme Court.” By becoming “involved in a consideration of the fundamental question
whether the constitution was to be regarded as an absolute limit to the legislative power,”
Willoughby suggested, the Court was able decide the issue “if possible, once for all” and having
set it forth the power “has never been seriously questioned since.” 98 Other textbooks did the
same, such as Clark Hare’s, which called Marbury “noteworthy not only for the point directly
involved, but as having authoritatively established that the judicial branch of the United States is
paramount, and may virtually annul every act or ordinance.” 99 As casebooks became the
dominant pedagogical tool for legal training at the turn of the twentieth century, Marbury entered
the teaching canon. 100 Other cases receded in significance or disappeared altogether. 101
By the end of the nineteenth century, celebrations of John Marshall’s contribution to
judicial review in Marbury were in full swing. Chief Justice Waite added to the myth of Marbury
with his address during the unveiling of the statue of John Marshall on the fiftieth anniversary of
his death. As Waite characterized it, by the time of Marshall’s ascension to the bench, “nothing
had been done judicially to define the powers or develop the resources of the Constitution.”102
Waite simply stated that it was in Marbury that “for the first time, it was announced by the
Supreme Court that it was the duty of the judiciary to declare an act of the legislative department
of the Government invalid if clearly repugnant to the Constitution.” 103 This was the only
decision of Marshall’s that Waite singled out in his speech, and it was also singled out in similar
terms by representative of the Philadelphia bar who helped fund the statue. James Bryce singled
out Marbury as the “famous judgment” that “laid down” the doctrine that courts gave binding
interpretations of the Constitution.104
By the end of the Gilded Age, the authority of courts to control legislatures was
increasingly contested but was also now being held up as essential to the constitutional
enterprise. Marbury became the symbol of this feature of American constitutionalism. Other
features of Marbury that had made the case of great importance to judges and lawyers earlier in
the nineteenth century were deemphasized. Marbury was repositioned as a case centrally about
judicial review, which in turn was regarded as essential “constitutional liberty” and “security of
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property,” as Kent had argued a half century before. 105 Henry Hitchcock, a co-founder and
eighteenth president of the American Bar Association, declared that the “power of the court to
declare void an Act of Congress repugnant to the Constitution” was “determined” and
“establish[ed]” in Marbury. Hitchcock took note of the fact that others had tended to dwell on
the “immense importance” of the decision for subjecting executive branch officers “to the
control of the courts,” but he believed that it was Marshall’s “demonstration” of the power of
courts to void legislation that “lies at the very root of our system of government.” 106 Hitchcock’s
emphasis on the importance of judicial review was echoed by others at the turn of the century.
Justice David Brewer told the New York bar association that the “salvation of the nation”
depended on the “independence and vigor of the judiciary” that would not “yield to the pressure
of numbers, that so-called demand of the majority.” 107 Similarly, Justice Stephen Field warned
during the centennial celebration of the Supreme Court that only with the support of the people
and the bar could the judges be expected to act with the necessary “fearlessness” and guard
against “unrestrained legislative will . . . [and] arbitrary power.” 108 In his presidential address to
the American Bar Association, John F. Dillon warned his colleagues of the “despotism of the
many – of the majority” and called on them to “defend, protect and preserve” the constitutional
provisions and the power of judicial review that had been put in place as “the only breakwater
against the haste and the passions of the people.” 109 It was Dillon who organized a national
celebration of “Marshall Day” in honor of the appointment of the great chief justice, and who
helped mobilize the memory of John Marshall and the canonization of Marbury as supports for
the maintenance and exercise of judicial review at the turn of the twentieth century. 110
Ironically, the supporters of judicial review at the end of the nineteenth century preferred
to rest their case on the historical reputation of a single individual – John Marshall – and in doing
so downplayed the other authorities for judicial review that predated the mandamus case. Where
earlier judges and commentators had tended to emphasize, like Justice Chase, the “general
sentiment” 111 of the period as expressed in extrajudicial sources, state cases, federal circuit court
cases, and Supreme Court cases, late nineteenth century commentators and judges tended to give
exclusive emphasis to Marbury as an authoritative statement on the power of the courts to
enforce constitutional limits on legislatures. On the one hand, this focused attention on the
“clear” and “forcible” 112 language of John Marshall and on the prestige of the author and
institution, and traded on the already established importance of Marbury as a case about
executive power and court jurisdiction. On the other hand, this emphasis opened up the
argument to the vulnerability that Marshall might have usurped authority and invented the power
of judicial review out of whole cloth at the late date of 1803. In either case, both sides of the
Progressive era debates agreed on Marbury’s importance to the doctrine of judicial review, and
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variations of the claim the Chief Justice John Marshall and the Supreme Court had done
something special in 1803 to establish a power of judicial review were common by the early
twentieth century in a way that they had not been through most of the nineteenth century.
VI. Conclusion
Marbury is now firmly entrenched in the constitutional canon, and it stands most
preeminently for the power of courts to authoritatively interpret constitutions and nullify laws
that they regard as in violation of constitutional requirements. The U.S. Supreme Court itself
now readily points to Marbury as “establish[ing] beyond question” the power of judicial
review. 113 Nothing is more basic to modern cultural literacy about American constitutionalism
than to attribute the creation of the power of judicial review to John Marshall and Marbury v.
Madison.
This construction of Marbury is of modern origin. Marbury became the flashpoint for
debates over the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation during the Lochner era. Revisionist
scholarship on Marbury has suggested that the case was not that important to establishing
judicial review in the early republic and that it was not seen as an especially important case in the
early republic. This article replicates and extends the existing work on the reception and use of
Marbury, shedding light on its meaning over time and the process of constitutional canonization
and the transmission and transformation of precedents.
Our findings reinforce and modify the lessons of the existing literature on Marbury and
on the theory of the constitutional canon. Our extended citation analysis from federal and state
courts and legislative and executive documents and our qualitative analysis of judicial opinions
and legal commentators support the view that Marbury did not carry the meaning and
significance relative to the power of judicial review in the early nineteenth century that it carries
now. At the same time, we believe earlier scholars have gone too far in concluding that Marbury
was of little significance in the nineteenth century. Although the U.S. Supreme Court rarely
cited the case in support of its authority to exercise the power of judicial review in its opinions
until the twentieth century, it routinely cited Marbury for other purposes. Other courts and
commentators likewise recognized Marbury as being a “great case” from early in the nineteenth
century because of its substantive statements about the constitutional jurisdiction of courts and
the judicial authority to oversee the executive branch. As a high-profile case standing firmly for
the view that the American constitutional system was one of “a government of laws, and not of
men,” it was a short step to borrow its authority when judicial review of legislation became more
salient in the late nineteenth century. 114 Moreover, Marbury was routinely included as part of a
set of authorities that were cited to support or demonstrate the power of judicial review in the
nineteenth century. Marbury was a ready candidate for canonization.
Early commentators varied on the extent to which they treated Marbury as a notable case
relative to judicial review. Some ignored it entirely. Others highlighted it. Most simply
included it in a long list of relevant authorities on the subject. What distinguished most early
discussions of Marbury and judicial review from later discussions is context and significance.
Early commentators recognized Marbury as one of many authorities on the subject, and (for the
most part) they gave no particular pride of place to Marbury and did not attribute any causal
significance for constitutional development relative to judicial review to the Marshall Court’s
113
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decision in the case. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, Marbury was increasingly
allowed to stand on its own as an authority for the power of judicial review and commentators
were increasingly attributing special significance to Marshall’s opinion. It was no longer merely
a quotable summary of a common sentiment of the founding era. Through force of reasoning
and will, it was now thought to have somehow decisively “settled” an “open question.”
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Figure 1: Number of Federal and State Cases Citing Marbury v. Madison, 1803-2008
Note: Centered, five-year moving average. U.S. Supreme Court citations on the right axis.
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Figure 2: Number of Federal and State Cases Citing Marbury v. Madison for the Power of
Judicial Review, 1803-2008
Note: Centered, five-year moving average. U.S. Supreme Court citations on the right axis. Figure
based on a content analysis of decisions citing Marbury v. Madison. Figure includes all
U.S. Supreme Court cases and estimate of state and circuit court cases based on content
analysis of stratified, random sample of Marbury-citing cases.
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Figure 3: Proportion of Cases Citing Marbury for the Power of Judicial Review by Type of Court
and Time Period
Note: Figure based on a content analysis of decisions citing Marbury v. Madison. Figure includes
all U.S. Supreme Court cases and estimate of state and circuit court cases based on
content analysis of stratified, random sample of Marbury-citing cases.
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Figure 4: Annual Number of References to Marbury in Congressional Debates, 1803-2002.
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Figure 5: Number of Federal and State Cases Citing Early Federal Judicial Review Cases, 17891900.
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Figure 6: Number of Federal and State Cases Quoting from Marbury v. Madison, 1803-2000
Note: Includes all state and federal cases quoting from select lines from Marbury opinion from
1803-2000, found using Westlaw. “Duty of Judicial Department” category includes
cases quoting from “emphatically the duty and province of the judicial department to say
what the law is.” “Paramount Law” category includes cases quoting from “constitution is
either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts.” “Limited Power” category is a composite including cases
quoting from any of the following: “giving to the legislature a practical and real
omnipotence”; “the powers of the legislature are defined, and limited”; “distinction,
between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished”; “to what
purpose are powers limited.”

